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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Pl.aintiff-Respondent,

vs.
IV A LEE GILLIAN,

Case No.
11314

Def endant-Appeltant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CA·SE
This is a criminal proceeding in which the defendant,
Iva Lee Gillian, was charged with 'the crime of murder in
the first degree, in violaition of Title 76, Ohaipter 30, Section 1, Utah Code Anno'talted, 1953, by Information filed
in the District Courlt of :tJhe Third J udidaJl District, in and
for Sa1t Lake County, Slbwte of Urtah, on December 26, 1967.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The defendant was tried before a jury, commencing
January 30, 1968, before the HonoraJble Marcellus K. Snow.
The defendant w:as found guilty by verdict of 'the jury,
entered February 2, 1968, of the crime of murder in lthe
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fin>t degree, with recommendation of leniency. Thereafter,
on rbhe 14th day of February, 1968, defendant, Iva Lee
Gillian, was sentenced to confinement in the Utah State
Prison for a term od' [ife.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Gillian seeks a new trlial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 4, 1967, the VlicitJim, Jes<Se A. Melton,
was living with one WiIHam MiHer at Apartment No. 3,
21 WMt 1700 South Street (Tr. 304). Mellton had been
living with Miller for approxJimately one week prior to
November 4, and as 1:Jhere was only one bed ~n the apartment, slept on the floor alongside of Miller's bed (Tr. 305).
The defendant had known Miller since 1958, and from
1958 until 1962 hiad lived wi1Jh him, at least part orf the
time (Tr. 357) .. From 1962 until 1967, the defendant continued to see Miiller from time to time, but their reliaitionship during that period was one of "just friends" (Tr.
357).
During the afternoon and evening of November 3,
1967, the deceased and MiNer had passed their time drinking some unknown quantity of wihiskey and beer (Tr. 306,
313). Late that night one Bernice Simmons, a friend of
the deeeased'.s, appeared at the apartment (Tr. 314), and
the three of them - the deceased, Miller, and Mrs. Simmons ,_.__ had what was described as a "Hittle party" (Tr.
306). At some undetermined time when the party broke
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up, the three then reitJired for the night wilth Miller and
Mrs. S'immons sleeping ibogelther on MiHer's bed and the
deceased sleeping on the floor (Tr. 306) . There is a di1spulte in the rtestimony as to whether Miller and Mrs. Simmons were dressed or undressed and whether one or the
dther, or both, were under or on rtop of the covers of the
bed (Tr.307,366).
During the afternoon and evening of November 3, rllhe
defendant had been armnging plans to go hunting wiith a
friend, one He:ribert Gurkey (Tr. 361, 363). ThaJt evening,
Gurkey dropped by the defendanlt's home and indicated rto
her that the plans had dhanged and that he was nOlt going
to be able to take her hunting. As a result of !this conversaiti~:m, the defendanrt wa;s quite upset and disappointed and
took two or three phenobarbital !ta:Mets, wh!ich medication
had been prescribed as one of several medications for treatment of the defendant's diabetes and heart oondition for
the purpose of relaxing her and permi:tting her to sleep
(Tr. 363). Defendanlt was still unable to sleep and consequently took more of her medication. By approximately
5 :30 or 6 :00 o'clock iin the mornling of November 4, 1968,
she had taken six tablets, and was consequently not lucid
or alert as to her own actions (Tr. 365) .
1

She then left her residence and ultimately arrived rut
Miner's aparlmenrt seeking to have a cup of coffee with
him (Tr. 366). From tha't time, and unltil the time the deceased was killed, the testimony at tri'al fa at variance.
According to the testimony of MiiHer and Simmons:
Sometime between 6 :30 and 7 :00 o'c'lock a.m., the defen-
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dant knocked at the door of Mi.Ber's apartment. Miller got
up and opened the door, and the defendant walked in and
saw Mrs. Simmons -sittJing on rthe side of the bed, and the
deceased was lying on the floor. Upon seeing Mrs. Simmons and tJhe deceased, defendant asked Mil1er what they
were d~irrg there, to whieh Miner responded rthaJt it wru;
none of her busine.ss, whereupon, according to Miller, the
defendant slapped him. At that point Miller pushed her
out of the door and locked it (Tr. 297, 307-309).
According to the defendant's testimony: After knocking upon 'the door, Mr. Miller opened the door and said
"Come in." As the defendant walked in, she observed Mrs.
Simmons lying on the bed, and the latter immediately
jumped up !holding the cover and said, "I got drunk last
night." The defendant observed that Mrs. Simmons had
no clothing on her shoulders. Miller then walked back to
the bed and sa:'t down, and the defendant then asked, "How
could you sleep with her when 'Speedy' [Mrs. Simmons'
husband] is one of your best friends?" To this he replied,
"You son-of~a- ____________ so, it's none of your business" (Tr.
366).
"* * * and I slapped his face and as I turned
around to walk back out he slapped me. He kept
slapping me and I foll in the closet and he kept
beating me and kicking me. He pulled me up by
my blouse and slapping me and she was - Miss
Simmons - I could hear her saying, 'No. No, Bill,
don't. No. No, Bill. Bill, please don't.' and then he
threw me out in the hall" (Tr. 367).
In the melee, the defendant's blouse was torn (Tr. 368,

Ex. 13).
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The defendant then proceeded to her car, .got a gun
out of it, and walked around rbo lthe weslt window of :the
aparitmenrt (Tr. 369). The .window Sill was over five feet
from the ground (Tr. 187), and a dvape was over the window, opened at the bo1:11Jom orrly an inch and a half to ·two
inches (Tr. 198).
"Q.

What did you do then?

"A. I went to my car and happened rto think
I had the gun in the car and I thoughrt, well, I
would - I would .scare him for hu:riting me.
"Q. And then what did you do? What were
you thinking about alt that ltime?

"A. Th:at's a:ll I had 'in mind or thinking
about. lit was thought I would scare him for beating
upon me. My legs and wrists was bllack spots. Beat
mostly on my head with his big hands. I -Only recaH
shooting twice through the Window, h~igh.
"Q.

Now, before we giet inlto that, Mrs. Gil-

~ian, 'let me rusk you if you saw anyone else in the

apa1'tment asride from BiH and Bernice and Simmons?
"A.

No, I did not.

"Q.

Now, after you giot the gun what did you

"A.

Pardon?

"Q.

After you got the gun what did you do?

do?

"A. I went Ito the we.sit window. It was up
(indicating) and I i!Jhoughlt I'd shodt up juslt to scare
1

Mr. Miller.
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"Q.
room?

And what then? Did you shoot into the

"A. All I remember - remember is shooting
twice and then I went back to my car and got in
and went over to Rex and Bud's through the back
door, tried to get a cup of coffee before I drove
home (Tr. 368-369).

* * * * *

"Q. How did you feel about Bill after he
struck you?

"A. Well, I - I just was hurt the way because I would have walked out on my own and I
didn't slap him hard in the first place. I don't like
to be called a name.
"Q.

What did he call you?

"A. He called me a son-of-a-bitch and I feel
like somebody calls me that they're calling that to
my mother and, no, I wasn't very happy the way he
beat upon me.
"Q.

How did you feel toward him?

"A.

Well, I was very angry at him.

"Q.

Did you know a Jesse Melton?

"A.

y,es, I do.

"Q.

How long have you known Jesse Melton?

"A. I didn't know Jesse Melton - well, off
and on the last five years maybe I'd seen Jesse
three or four times. But he'd always treaited me
very nice.
Did you have any reason to be angry at
Jesse Melton?
"Q.
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"A. Oh, no. I don't think Jesse Melton would
harm a flea.
"Q.

him?

Did you h!ave any reason to want to kill

"A. Oh, no. Not to kill anyone. I couldn't
kHI anyone.
"Q. Now, ait ,the time you were aitanding by
the window you knew you had a gun in your hand,
didn't you.

"A.

Yeah.

"Q. And you knew that there were at least
two people in the apartment, didn't you?

"A. Yes, but I knew that Bernice Simmons,
which I didn't know her name until afterwards.
"Q. You knew there was a possibility if you
fired into that room you might injure somebody,
didn't you?

"A. Well, I didn't think about that because it
wasn't - I dlidn't have that intention in my mind.
It wasn't going through my mind.
"Q. I want you to tell the members of the
jury, now, what you had in your mind when you
had the pistol pointing in the ,window?

"A. I just thought I'd make him squirm a
little bi:t, since that wasn't the first time. He beat
me up a few years ago. He had broken my face.
"Q.

Did you intend to shoot at Mr. Miller?

"A. No, definite'ly not. If I had wanted to
shoot Mr. Mill~r I would have waited until he C2.me
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out and I certainly wouldn't have gone there to
,shoot him. I wouldn't have done it while he had
witnesses.
"Q.

Did you intend to injure Mr. MiHer?

"A.

No" (Tr. 372-373).

At the trial, the court refused to permit the entire tape
or the transcript of defendant's confession Ito go before the
jury, allowing the District Attorney to select only such parts
as he deemed proper for his case to go before the jury (Tr.
425-430); permitted the prosecution to extensively cover an
alleged prior aot of misconduct committed by the defendant
upon William Miller some seven years before (Tr. 333, 378379); and finally instructed the jury that it could return
three possible verdiots : first degree murder with a recommendation of leniency, first degree murder without a recommendation of leniency, or acquittal (Tr. 80). Defendant
had requested Instructions regarding lesser included offenses which were refused (Tr. 46-49).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSES.
A cursory reading of the transcript of this trial strikes
one with an abiding sense of unfairness. In practical terms,
the lawyer does not and should not feel unduly sensative
when a court rules against h'im; however, when one finds
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delightful surprise, GS one does when he reads this transcript, in a single suslbaining ruling in favor of the defense
counsel (Tr. 241), then one can on'ly oonclude that either
his sense of j uSltice tis perhaps rtoo idea1is1Jic, or that this
defendant had all the cards stacked against her. The
record is replete with instances where iUhe defendant's
counsel was unaJble rto adequately present a defense of mitigation, and was ultimwtely required to argue rto the jury
that his client, who had confessed itJo the shooting, was not
guilty of first degree murder as charged - the only alternative that the jury had by way of conviction - but
rather should be acquitted. Thwt any defense counsel
should be placed in such a position under 1Jhe facts of this
case shows the inequity of the court's rulfogs against defendant throughout the trial and of its instructions to the
jury at the end of the trial. While it is, of course, this
latter matter of which the defendant compla:ins under rthis
Point on appeal, it is strongly urged thait 'a proper perspective of the impossible position of defendant under the instructions as given by the court can only be gained by a
thorough read~ng of the entire transcript in order to gain
insight into the atmosphere and aura of the trial which led
up to :the conviction of this defendant.
In its final instruction to the jury, the Court removed
the signifiicant questions 'Of absence or presence of premedta tion and deliberation from the jury, it took away from
them those substantial and important factors of sudden
anger and heat of passion, and indeed it took away from
them the penultimate jury function of determining whether

10
the facts of this particular case involving this pamcular
defendant, in the particular circumstances in which the
incident in question arose, involved aots constituting first
degree murder, or whether in fact the ciircumstan<:es were
such that the defendanJt's acts constituted second degree
murder, or something less. By its irn~tructions, the Court
effectively precluded a consideration by the jury - just as
though it had stricken the evidence from the record - of
the testimony of the defendant concerning her intentions
and her actions on that occasion. Thus the Court commanded the jury :
"When you retire to deliberate you should appoint one of your number as foreman. Your verdict
must be in writing, dated and signed by your foreman, and when found must be returned by you into
court.
"In this case your verdict must be with reference to the defendant Iva Lee Gillian:
"1. Guilty of the crime of murder in the first
degree, as charged in the Information; or
"2. Guilty of the crime of murder in the first
degree, as charged in the Information, with the
recommendation of leniency; or
"3.

Not guilty" (Tr. 80).

In giving this instruction, it is clear that the Court adopted,
lock, stock, and barrel, the State's theory that where a person is killed by an act of another, that act is inherently
greatly dangerous and evidences a depraved mind, regard-

less of human life (Tr. 68).
At the outset, it should be made perfectly dear that
this is not a case involving the application of the "Felony-
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Murder rule" in which lesser included offenses cannot exist, State V. Condit, 125 P. 2d 801, nor is it a case in which
the defendant failed to take the stand to testify regarding
mitigating circumstances, State v. Matteri, 225 P. 2d 325
and it is not a case where defendant failed to request instruotions on lesser included offenses (Tr. 46, 47, 48).
Thus the prime question for this Court on this appeal is
whether there was sufficient evidence before the trial
court to require instructions regarding lesser offenses included within the offense of murder in the first degree, as
were requested by defendant.

A.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
REQUIRE INSTRUCTIONS AS TO LESSER
HTCLUDED OFFENSES.
The test for what is a lesser included offense is succinctly stated in State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.
2d 27 ( 1962), wherein this Court stated at 29, 371 P. 2d:
1

"The rule as to when one offense is included in
another is that the grea:ter offense includes a lesser
one when establislhment of the .greater would necessarily include proof of all of the e'lements necessary
to prove the lesser. Conversely, it is only when the
proof of the lesser offense requires some element
not involved in the greater offense that the lesser
would not be an included offense. * * *
"In refusing the state's [requested instructions
as to the lesser 1included offense] it committed error
against the state."
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The defendant recognizes that there are some instances
in which there is no lesser included offense for a specific
type of first degree murder, as where the "Felony-Murder
rule" pertains. State V. Condit, supra. And it is not undlisputed that where the defendant fails Vo request insitructions as to lesser induded offenses, contrary to the fact
situation here, the 'lower court is not requlired to so instruct
the jury. State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P. 2d 618
( 1955). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that when there
is evidence sufficient 1Jo support a verdict of the greater
offem;e, which necessarily includes evidence of all elements
of the lesser offense, and vvhere, as here, the defendant requested such instructions, then it is palpaJble prejudicial
error for the trial court to omi,t instruction as to the lesser
included offenses. State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac.
55 (1929).
The record discloses that there was an abundance of
evidence on which the jury could predicate an absence of
premeditation and deliberation; an absence of depraved
mind, regardless of human rife; an absence of intent; a
presence of heat of passion and sudden quarrel; and the
presence of mitigating factors which are critical in determining the essential nature of the defendant's act. Wirth
the respective absence and presence of such factorn, a trial
court should not make its own findings as to the weight
to be given to such evidence by excluding it from consideration by the jury, for the determination of the sufficiency, weight and befievability of such evidence is 1Jhe
prerogative of the jury and not the court. State V. Severns,
1
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148 P. 2d 488 (Kans. 1944). Doubtless, the testimony of
a defendant in a criminal prosecution 'is likeiy to be more
weighted in her own favor, ibut tJhis is a factor which the
jury must determine as the sole and exclusive trier of fact.
This exclusive province of the jury is negated when the
court, as here, effectively precludes the jury from determining, in the circumstances, that the act of defendant was
or was not greatly dangerous to the lives of orthers, or
whether it was or was not such an act as evidenced a depmved mind, regiardless of human life. In doing so, the
court here became an arbiter of the weight of the evidence
and effectively said to the jury:
You are instructed either to acquit the defendant, which is incredible under the evidence, or
you are instructed that her act, which she has admitted, was greatly dangerous to the Hves of dthers,
evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human
life.
There was sufficient evidence, in spite of the Court's directed verdict, based on the testimony of the defendant
alone, tJhe weighlt of which was to be determined by the
jury, that the act was neither calcu1ated to put ithe lives
of the three occupants of Miller's apartment in jeopardy
nor the life of any one of them, ,and thus the aot was not,
as conrtemplated by the law, a "greatly dangerous act to the
lives of others evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of
human life."
The dilemma of rthis jury wrus, of course, that it, based
upon the evidence before it and upon the court's instructions, must eitlher convict of the one crime as to whdch the
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evidence was equivocal in supporl of all elements thereof·
or acquit of any crime, which result would be totally un~
supported by the evidence. The result in either event provides justice for neither the defendant nor the public, for
the jury is forced to reach a result not supported by 1:1he
evidence.
In this regard, this court recognized in State
64 Utah 285, 230 Pac. 349 (1924) that:

v. Hymas,

"H is, however, always a delicate matter for a
trial court to withhold from ,the jury the right to
find the accused guilty of a lesser or included offense, and determine the question of the state of the
evidence as a matter of law. That should be done
only in very clear cases."

This is not such a clear case. There is no eyewitness
te-stimony evidencing defendant's adt except her own. There
is no testimony as to her mental sta:te except her own. The
state's evidence as to the environs of the act is garbled,
painfully unintelligible, and, aJt points, meaningless (Tr.
173-176, 177-182, 188-190). It is unclear how high the
builet holes in the room were, or where they were located
(Tr. 193-194, 198, 211).
On the other hand, there was abundant evidence produced by the state and the defendant supporting, both inferentially and explicitly, a conclusion that defendant's
acts arose from sudden anger or heat of passion (Tr. 366,
367, 368, 369, 372-373); that her acts, while perhaps greatly
dangerous, were not those of a depraved mind, without
regard of human life (Tr. 368-369); or tJhat her acts were
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not even greatly dangerous as those calculated to put the
lives of many persons in jeopardy (Tr. 372-373).
Thus, the defendant walks in and finds Miller and
Simmons in a questiona;ble circumstance. The defendant
questions the propriety of the situation. Mil1er, the defendant's former lover, beats her to the floor and pushes
her out of the door. ·Defendant becomes angered and gets
a gun intending to scare Miller. She shoots int-0 an open
window which was over five feet from the ground. There
was no calculation or determination to take a life or fo kill
anyone, much less Jesse Melton. This was all in evidence
before the jury to be given as much weight as it thought
proper. But the court by its instructions removed that prerogative from the jury and the latter was not permitted
to consider any mitigating factors which would ameliorate
the gravity of the act. And Iva Lee Gillian was found guilty
of first degree murder.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HA VE INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Where tJhe evidence is sufficient to support a lesser
included offense, the trial court is duty bound to so insitruct
the jury as a matter of law. People v. Carmen, 228 P. 2d
281 (CaHf. 1951); People v. Yancy, 340 P. 2d 328 (Calif.
1959); State v. Anderson, 352 P. 2d 972 (Ida. 1960); State
v. Ulibarri, 355 P. 2d 275 (N. M. 1960); Harris V. State, 291
P. 2d 372 (Okl·a.1955).
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Some courts have articulated 'the rule as this: That
failure to give instructions on included offenses where there
is any evidence supportive of the included offense ~s prejudicial error. People v. Brown, 281 P. 2d 3'19 (Calff. 1955);
People v. Burns, 200 P. 2d 134 (Calif. 1948). And in stating its version of the rule, the Washington Supreme Court
has said that a lesser degree of the crime must be submitted
along with the greater degree unless the evidence positively
excludes any inference that the lesser crime was committed.
State V. Gallagher, 103 P. 2d 1100 (Wash. 1940).
The rule of this court e'loquently speaks for itself in
State v. Ferguson, supra. There, Justice Straup noted:
"If in a case of different degrees of the charged
greater offense :there is sufficient evidence fo submit the case to the jury of the charged greater
offense, I do not see where it is the prerogative of
the court to 'direct the jury of what degree only the
jury may find the defendant guilty, or direct
1Jhem that, if they do not find him guilty of the
charged greater offense, they must acquit him. To
permit the court to do this is to permit it to be the
judge of the facts. If the court for such purposes
may so consider rand weigh the evidence and find
the facts and thus so determine the degree, I see
no reason why the court, in such a case where the
evidence is conclusive and indisputably shows the
defendant's guilt of the charged greater offense,
where there is no rule or basis either in law or in
fact or any doubt whatever, may not equally direot
,a verdict of guilt. It is apparent tha:t the court may
not do either, for under the Constitultion and the
statute making the jury the sole judge of the facts,
they may render any kind of verdict with respect
1
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to any offense presented by and included within the
indictment or information."

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
THE PROSECUTION TO CROSS-EXAMINE
DEFENDANT A'S TO A PAST ACT OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT WHICH HAD NO RELEVANCE TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
On cross-e~amination of the defendant, by tJhe prosecutor, the court permitted an interrogaJtion, reiating to an
incident occurring seven years before, in which it was insinuated by 'the prosecutor that the defendant had unlawfully Msaulted the deceased (Tr. 339-340, 377-379) :
Now, you said you couldn't take a 1ife of
anyone, is that right?
"Q.

"A.

No, I couldn't.

"Q. Well, prior to this time you took a knife
to Mr. Melton and cut him up good, didn't you?

"Mr. Mi:tsunaga: Objection, Your Honor.
"The Witness: No, I did not.
"Q.

You were arrested for it.

"Mr. Mitsun:aga: Your Honor, that's outside
the scope of examination.
"The Witness: No, I never was arrested for
that.
"The Court : Just a minute, Mrs. Gillian.
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"Mr. Mitsunaga: 'Dhe Court has already made
a ruling that that incident if it occurred at all occurred seven or eight years ago.
"Mr. Banks: She has testified.
"The WitneS1s: Let him go ahead. I mean, this
isn't true and you won't find it on the record where
I was arrested for cutting Mr. MiHer up.
"The Court : Mrs. Gillian, the orrly thing the
Court's concerned with now is when your attorney
or either attorney makes an objection that means
tlhe Court has to make a ruling whether it's sustained or overruled and I can't do that when someone's .talking. L~ me think aibout this and we'll
know where we are.
"Mr. Banks: She has testified that she couldn't
take a life. I am priVTileged to go into this action of
hers that could show that she could do an act that
could result in great bodily injury or death.
1

"Mr. Mitsunaga: Well, she might have stamped
on a couple ants when she was child, too, but that
has no relevancy to her entire life. The Court's already made a ruling that this matter has been too
remote.
"Mr. Banks: That was on a different matter.
"The Court: Objection is overruled.
"Q. Now, you did threaten him with a knife,
didn't you.

"A. No, I didn't threaten him. 1961 I was in
1Jhe kitchen doing the dishes and he came in kicking
me and slwpping me and I had a perrfog knife and
I told him not to hit me anymore and that's as far
as rthat went and there was no arrest for that.
1
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"Q. You used the knife against him, didn't
you, lbut Mm?
1

"A. If I had threatened him with a knife it
would have !been self defense.
you?

"Q.

WeU., I know, but you did cut him, dddn't

"A.

No, I don't recaH cutting him.

"Q.

He had to go to the hospital.

"A. Th:aJt's when I hit him over the head with
the percu1ator. Had two stitches in hilS head. That
wasn't a knife and thait's on .the record."
The universally accepted general rU'le, 'as stated in
State v. Dickson, 12 U'ta:h 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961), is
tha!t evidence of other acts or crimes of a defendant is not
admissible if its effect is merely to disgrace the defendant
or show a propensity to commit crime, and rtJhus only where
the evidence has "speciral relevancy to prove the crime of
Which the defendant stands charged may it be allowed for
that purpose" 361 P. 2d ait 415.
The incidenrt in question here - and the prosecutor
seemed to !be rather confused as to the nature of that incident - to the extent that it is relevant at aH ito the killing
of Jesse Melton, was remote [n time; did not involve the
deceased; was an act of self~defen1se; resulted nether dn
arrest nor charge, much 'less conviction; proved no material
faClt; and dlid not tend ito slhow any motive, scheme, plan or
system. Thus it had no "special relevancy .to prove the
crime" of which the defendant stood charged as required
under the Dickson test and was iniadmissrble.
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Inasmuch as the effect of the prosecution's interrogation on the jury's verdidt can not be measured or weighed,
th'is Court, as ~ ha.a done in the past, should find prejudicial error and grant defendant a new trial. State v. Poe,
21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted rthat under Uibah law, the
tria;l court erred prejudicially in failing to instruct the
jury, a;s requested, as to the lesser offenses of second degree murder and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter,
which are necessarily included within lthe greater offense
of first degree murder; and in permitting the prooecutor
to cross-examine the defendant regarding an act or crime
which hlad no special relevancy to prove rthe crime of which
the defendant was charged and which had occurred seven
1

years before.
Accordingly it ris urged that this court grant a new
trial
Respectfully sUJbmitted,
JOHN D. O'CONNELL
231 E)a:st F1ourth South
Sallt Lake City, Uitah
STEWART M. HANSON, JR.
400 EI Paso Gas Building
Sa~t Lake City, Urtah
Attorneys for Appellant

